The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) issued its second report on the incidents in Saraqib, in southern Idlib, on February 4, 2018, confirming the responsibility of the Syrian regime for carrying out airstrikes loaded with chemical substances on Saraqib.
The team published its report on April 12, 2021, under reference number (S/1943/2021), in accordance with paragraph 10 of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, addressing the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons in the Saraqib incident.
The OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (hereafter referred to as the “Investigation Team”) was established by a decision of the Conference of the States Parties, dated June 27, 2018.
The report noted that the Investigation Team is not a judicial body with the authority to assign individual criminal responsibility. It does not have the power to issue final conclusions regarding non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Rather, the team’s mandate is to “establish facts.”
This report also explained the legal and practical challenges involved in the Investigation Team’s work and the conclusions it reached through investigations conducted between April 2020 and March 2021 concerning the incident in Saraqib on February 4, 2018.
The IIT began its work in June 2019, building upon the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which confirmed the use of chemical weapons in several incidents in Syria. However, the Joint Investigative Mechanism between the OPCW and the UN had not reached final conclusions regarding these incidents.
Targeting of Saraqib, Idlib Countryside, on February 4, 2018
The report confirmed that the Investigation Team was unable to access the incident sites in Syria. The team expressed regret that the Syrian regime did not allow it to carry out its tasks, despite multiple requests made by the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat and the Syrian regime’s commitment to cooperate under paragraph 7 of Article 7 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as Syria’s obligation under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 of 2013 to cooperate fully with the OPCW.
The Investigation Team conducted interviews with 19 individuals, including victims, people who were present in the area, or those who participated in rescue operations. It also obtained videos, documents, and other materials from various sources regarding the incidents, analyzed samples, requested assessments from experts and forensic institutes, and gathered information from open sources.
During its collection and verification of information, the team engaged with local entities, including the Syrian Chemical Violations Documentation Center (CVDCS), which provided certain information.
The report provided a detailed account of the team’s activities, the investigative approach, scenarios, and claims it examined, as well as the general situation in the area and the military context of each incident.
The approach taken by the Investigation Team in this report mirrored that of the first report. It analyzed information received from the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), requested information from state parties and international and non-governmental organizations, evaluated witness statements, obtained videos and documents from various sources, requested re-examinations of previous sample analyses, and more.
The report concluded that, based on all the information obtained and analyzed, at approximately 9:22 PM local time on February 4, 2018, a military helicopter (coded Alpha-253) affiliated with the Tiger Forces of the Syrian Air Force dropped at least one cylinder in eastern Saraqib, which released a toxic gas (chlorine).
According to the report, the spread of chlorine gas injured 12 people (whose names the team was able to identify), 11 of whom received treatment at the Sarmin field hospital. They exhibited symptoms of chlorine exposure, with seven of them being together in one shelter at the time of the incident.
The Investigation Team also obtained information indicating that a colonel (whose name was not disclosed) served as the operations commander for the Tiger Forces and was in charge of another operations room, under the authority of a brigadier general (whose name was also withheld). These two were reportedly heard on radio communications issuing direct orders to pilots to conduct airstrikes between 2017 and 2018.
The team also considered information about the presence of Tiger Forces and their helicopters at the Muajanzarat Airbase, in the context of a campaign launched in the area based on orders from the central command, during a period of increased aerial activity over Saraqib.
The report confirmed that the Investigation Team reached its conclusions gradually, after considering various theories, and determined that its findings were the only reasonable conclusions that could be drawn “based on the combined information obtained” and according to the standard of “reasonable grounds” for certainty.
assad_regime chemical_attack chemical_weapons IIT opcw saraqib syria
