The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) issued its third report on the Douma incident in rural Damascus on April 7, 2018, confirming the Syrian regime’s responsibility for carrying out chemical-laden airstrikes on Douma.
The team published its report on January 27, 2023, under document number (S/2125/2023), in accordance with paragraph 10 of decision C-SS-4/Dec.3, to address the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons in the Douma incident.
The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), also referred to as the “Investigation Team,” was established by the OPCW based on the decision made by the Conference of the States Parties on June 27, 2018.
The report clarified that the Investigation Team is not a judicial body with the authority to assign individual criminal responsibility, nor does it have the authority to make final conclusions regarding non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Rather, its mandate is to “establish facts.”
The report also explained the legal and practical challenges involved in the work of the Investigation Team, and the conclusions it reached through investigations conducted between January 2021 and December 2022 into the Douma incident on April 7, 2018.
The IIT began its work in June 2019, based on the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which had confirmed the use of chemical weapons on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic in several incidents. However, the joint investigation mechanism between the OPCW and the United Nations had not reached a final conclusion regarding these incidents.
The report confirmed that the Investigation Team was unable to access the incident sites in Syria, expressing regret that the Syrian regime did not allow the team to carry out its tasks despite multiple requests made by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The Syrian authorities had pledged to cooperate with the Secretariat under paragraph 7 of Article 7 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Syria was obligated under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) to fully cooperate with the OPCW.
The Attack on Douma, Rural Damascus, April 7, 2018
The Investigation Team obtained 66 witness statements, five of which were provided by women, and evaluated them. It also reviewed data related to 70 samples, obtained videos, documents, and other materials from various sources related to the incidents, analyzed the samples, and requested assessments from experts, specialists, and forensic institutes. The team also gathered information from open sources.
While collecting and verifying information and conducting interviews, the team communicated with local entities that assisted in providing some information, including entities under the auspices of the United Nations.
The report elaborated on the team’s activities, the approach taken during the investigation, the scenarios and allegations that were considered, and provided context about the overall situation in the area, as well as the military activities relevant to each incident.
The approach taken by the team in the Douma incident report is consistent with the methods used in the first and second reports, by analyzing information received from the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), requesting information from state parties, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, evaluating witness statements, obtaining videos and documents from various sources, and requesting re-examination of previous sample analyses, among other actions.
The report concluded that, based on all the information obtained and analyzed, it was determined that at 7:40 PM local time on April 7, 2018, during a large-scale military attack, a Mi-8/17 helicopter belonging to the Syrian Air Force’s Tiger Forces, after taking off from Dumayr airbase, dropped two yellow cylinders on two residential buildings in the center of Douma.
According to the report, one of the cylinders hit the roof of a three-story building (without fully penetrating it), ruptured, and released a highly concentrated toxic chlorine gas, causing the deaths of 43 individuals (whose names the team was able to identify) and injuring dozens more.
The second cylinder struck the roof of a three-story uninhabited building, penetrated it, and fell into the apartment below the roof. The cylinder partially ruptured, and chlorine began to leak slowly, causing minor injuries to those who first arrived at the scene.
Credible sources indicated that Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan, the commander of the Tiger Forces (an elite unit fighting on various fronts in Syria), played a leading role in the operation. He had been entrusted with significant command responsibilities, alongside units from the Republican Guard.
According to information obtained by the Investigation Team, the Tiger Forces began arriving in Eastern Ghouta on February 13, 2018, as confirmed by photos and videos published on social media accounts belonging to both the Syrian army and the Tiger Forces. On February 17, 2018, photos were circulated showing Brigadier General Suheil al-Hassan delivering a speech to his soldiers, surrounded by security personnel from the Russian military. In his speech, al-Hassan promised to teach the “enemy forces” a lesson “in fighting and in fire,” according to his words.
The report confirmed that the Investigation Team reached its conclusions gradually, after considering various theories, and determined that its findings represented the only reasonable conclusions “based on the collective information obtained.” This conclusion was reached based on the standard of “reasonable grounds” for establishing certainty.
assad_regime chemical_attack chemical_weapons Damascus douma IIT opcw syria
